據(jù)伍德麥肯茲1月24日報道，伍德麥肯茲《能源轉(zhuǎn)型基本展望》認(rèn)為，到本世紀(jì)中葉，全球氣溫將比工業(yè)化前高出2.5-2.7℃。為了將升溫限制在1.5℃以內(nèi)，符合《巴黎協(xié)定》，能源轉(zhuǎn)型必須加速。

因此，能源轉(zhuǎn)型必須加速。世界有這樣做的手段、動機(jī)和機(jī)會。

加快能源轉(zhuǎn)型將帶來回報，無論是在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面還是在保護(hù)地球方面。但這將需要時間。分析表明，大部分持久的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益將在2050年之后實(shí)現(xiàn)。

通過避免氣溫上升造成的損害，防止氣候進(jìn)一步極端變暖可能會在未來三十年產(chǎn)生積極的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，但實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)所需的行動可能會產(chǎn)生抵消性的負(fù)面影響。根據(jù)對氣候破壞和減緩全球變暖影響的現(xiàn)有經(jīng)濟(jì)研究回顧，估計將變暖保持在1.5°C以內(nèi)將使2050年國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值（GDP）預(yù)測減少2.0%。

隨著時間的推移，新的過渡技術(shù)，即電動汽車、公用事業(yè)規(guī)模的電池、氫氣和碳捕獲與封存價格逐漸下降，低碳投資將比逐步淘汰的高碳替代品更具競爭力。這一轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)將在2035年左右出現(xiàn)，此后全球GDP增長將超過當(dāng)前基本假設(shè)，這意味著損失的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出可以在本世紀(jì)末得到補(bǔ)償。

一些經(jīng)濟(jì)體將比其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體感受到更多的影響。碳?xì)浠衔锍隹诤吞济芗徒?jīng)濟(jì)體的經(jīng)濟(jì)可能受到最大的沖擊。欠發(fā)達(dá)和低收入經(jīng)濟(jì)體將承擔(dān)不成比例的高負(fù)擔(dān)。對低收入國家的氣候融資，包括政府轉(zhuǎn)移支付和私營部門投資，可以幫助解決不平等問題。但是，真正公平和公正的過渡將需要超越目前期望的行動。

已經(jīng)接近凈零目標(biāo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體從現(xiàn)在到2050年將看到較小的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響。對于少數(shù)幸運(yùn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體來說，轉(zhuǎn)型根本不需要造成經(jīng)濟(jì)損失。那些處于更有利地位的國家，通常是較富裕的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，有很強(qiáng)的投資新技術(shù)的傾向，甚至可能在2050年之前在經(jīng)濟(jì)上受益。

一些面臨1.5°C目標(biāo)要求而負(fù)擔(dān)最大成本的國家也是預(yù)計在未來30年內(nèi)，人口增長最快的國家。對人口的影響是氣候變化的眾多不確定因素之一。如果限制全球變暖能夠提高人口增長率（按人均GDP計算），那么脫碳的成本可能會更大。

王佳晶 摘譯自 伍德麥肯茲

原文如下：

No pain, no gain

The economic consequences of accelerating the energy transition Wood Mackenzie's base-case Energy Transition Outlook sees global temperatures 2.5-2.7 °C above pre-industrial levels by mid-century. To limit this warming to 1.5 °C, in line with the Paris.

Agreement, the energy transition must accelerate. The world has the means, motive and opportunity to do so.

An accelerated energy transition will pay off - both in economic and planetary terms. But it's going to take time. Our analysis suggests that much of the lasting economic benefits will materialise beyond our forecast horizon of 2050.

Preventing more extreme warming is likely to have a positive economic impact over the next three decades, by avoiding damage caused by rising temperatures, But the actions required to deliver it could have an offsetting negative effect. based on a review of existing economic studies on climate damage and the impact of mitigating global warming, we estimate that keeping warming to 1.5 °C would shave 2.0% off our base-case gross domestic product (GDP) forecast for 2050.

As new transition technologies – electric vehicles, utility-scale batteries, hydrogen and carbon capture and storage - come down in price over time, there will come a point when low-carbon investments are more competitive than phased-out high-carbon alternatives. We think the turning point will be around 2035, after which global GDP growth will outpace our base case, meaning lost economic output could be recouped by the end of the century.

Some economies will feel the effects more than others. Hydrocarbon-exporting and carbon intensive economies are likely to see the biggest hits to economic output. Less developed and low-income economies will bear a disproportionally high burden. Climate finance for lower-income countries, including government transfers and private sector investment, can help address inequity. But a truly fair and just transition will require actions to exceed our current expectations.

Economies that are already closer to net-zero targets will see a smaller economic impact from now to 2050. For a fortunate few, the transition need not result in economic loss at all. Those that are better positioned - typically wealthier economies with a strong propensity to invest in new technologies - may even benefit economically by 2050.

Some countries facing the greatest burden from the costs of a 1.5 °C pathway are also among those expected to see the fastest growth in population over the next 30 years. The effect on population is one of the many uncertainties of climate change. If limiting global warming lifts population growth, in per capita GDP terms, the cost of decarbonisation could be even greater.